BREAKING NEWS: Supreme Court Issues Historic Obamacare Opinion

June 25, 2015

You ever heard of PPAC Act -- a Congressional Act passed in March 2010?  That law is formally known as the "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act," but in popular parlance it's known as "Obamacare." For some, it is the crowning glory of the Obama Administration; for others, it represents all that is wrong with the two-term President. Pick whichever side you prefer. I am not going to enter that fray in this article. 

On June 25, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held in King v. Burwell (Supreme Court, No. 14-114., 576 U. S. ____ , June 25, 2015) that tax credits are available to individuals in States that have a Federal Exchange.  Pointedly, the Opinion asserts that:

In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people. Our role is more confined-"to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan. 

Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what we see as Congress's plan, and that is the reading we adopt. 

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed. 

Page 21 of the Opinion

The 4th Circuit Upholds Obamacare

In King v. Burwell (Opinion, 4th Circuit, 14-1158, 759 F.3d 358, July 22, 2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("4Cir") we have the case of Plaintiffs (Virginia residents) who are in a state that did not create a state exchange under the Act and do not want to purchase health insurance from the federally created HealthCare.gov exchange. In response to their federal Complaint, a federal District Court and the 4th Circuit found that:

The plaintiffs-appellants bring this suit challenging the validity of an Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") final rule implementing the premium tax credit provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "ACA" or "Act"). The final rule interprets the ACA as authorizing the IRS to grant tax credits to individuals who purchase health insurance on both state-run insurance "Exchanges" and federally-facilitated "Exchanges" created and operated by the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). The plaintiffs contend that the IRS's interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute, which, they assert, authorizes tax credits only for individuals who purchase insurance on state-run Exchanges. For reasons explained below, we find that the applicable statutory language is ambiguous and subject to multiple interpretations. Applying deference to the IRS's determination, however, we uphold the rule as a permissible exercise of the agency's discretion. We thus affirm the judgment of the district court.

Page 5 of the 4Cir Opinion

Supreme Court Grants Certiorari

On November 7, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted Certiorari and cited the question presented as:

Section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code, which was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), authorizes federal tax-credit subsidies for health insurance coverage that is purchased through an "Exchange established by the State under section 1311" of the ACA.

The question presented is whether the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") may permissibly promulgate regulations to extend tax-credit subsidies to coverage purchased through Exchanges established by the federal government under section 1321 of the ACA.

Supreme Court Opinion

On June 25, 2015, the United States Supreme Court held that tax credits are available to individuals in States that have a Federal Exchange.  Pointedly, the Opinion asserts that:

In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by the people. Our role is more confined-"to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). That is easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done. A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the legislative plan. 

Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what we see as Congress's plan, and that is the reading we adopt. 

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is Affirmed. 

Page 21 of the Opinion


As set forth in the Supreme Court Opinion's "Syllabus":

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act grew out of a long history of failed health insurance reform. In the 1990s, several States sought to expand access to coverage by imposing a pair of insurance market regulations-a "guaranteed issue" requirement, which bars insurers from denying coverage to any person because of his health, and a "community rating" requirement, which bars insurers from charging a person higher premiums for the same reason. The reforms achieved the goal of expanding access to coverage, but they also encouraged people to wait until they got sick to buy insurance. The result was an economic "death spiral": premiums rose, the number of people buying insurance declined, and insurers left the market entirely. In 2006, however, Massachusetts discovered a way to make the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements work-by requiring individuals to buy insurance and by providing tax credits to certain individuals to make insurance more affordable. The combination of these three reforms-insurance market regulations, a coverage mandate, and tax credits-enabled Massachusetts to drastically reduce its uninsured rate. 

The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of the three key reforms that made the Massachusetts system successful. First, the Act adopts the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements. 42 U. S. C. §§300gg, 300gg-1. Second, the Act generally requires individuals to maintain health insurance coverage or make a payment to the IRS, unless the cost of buying insurance would exceed eight percent of that individual's income. 26 U. S. C. §5000A. And third, the Act seeks to make insurance more affordable by giving refundable tax credits to individuals with household incomes between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line. §36B. 

In addition to those three reforms, the Act requires the creation of an "Exchange" in each State-basically, a marketplace that allows people to compare and purchase insurance plans. The Act gives each State the opportunity to establish its own Exchange, but provides that the Federal Government will establish "such Exchange" if the State does not. 42 U. S. C. §§18031, 18041. Relatedly, the Act provides that tax credits "shall be allowed" for any "applicable taxpayer," 26 U. S. C. §36B(a), but only if the taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through "an Exchange established by the State under [42 U. S. C. §18031]," §§36B(b)-(c). An IRS regulation interprets that language as making tax credits available on "an Exchange," 26 CFR §1.36B-2, "regardless of whether the Exchange is established and operated by a State . . . or by HHS," 45 CFR §155.20.

Petitioners are four individuals who live in Virginia, which has a Federal Exchange. They do not wish to purchase health insurance. In their view, Virginia's Exchange does not qualify as "an Exchange established by the State under [42 U. S. C. §18031]," so they should not receive any tax credits. That would make the cost of buying insurance more than eight percent of petitioners' income, exempting them from the Act's coverage requirement. As a result of the IRS Rule, however, petitioners would receive tax credits. That would make the cost of buying insurance less than eight percent of their income, which would subject them to the Act's coverage requirement. 

Petitioners challenged the IRS Rule in Federal District Court. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that the Act unambiguously made tax credits available to individuals enrolled through a Federal Exchange. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Fourth Circuit viewed the Act as ambiguous, and deferred to the IRS's interpretation under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837. 

Held: Section 36B's tax credits are available to individuals in States that have a Federal Exchange. Pp. 7-21. 

(a) When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a statute, this Court often applies the two-step framework announced in Chevron, 467 U. S. 837. But Chevron does not provide the appropriate framework here. The tax credits are one of the Act's key reforms and whether they are available on Federal Exchanges is a question of deep "economic and political significance"; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly. And it is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.

It is instead the Court's task to determine the correct reading of Cite as: 576 U. S. ____ (2015) 3 Syllabus Section 36B. If the statutory language is plain, the Court must enforce it according to its terms. But oftentimes the meaning-or ambiguity-of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context. So when deciding whether the language is plain, the Court must read the words "in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133. Pp. 7-9. 

(b) When read in context, the phrase "an Exchange established by the State under [42 U. S. C. §18031]" is properly viewed as ambiguous. The phrase may be limited in its reach to State Exchanges. But it could also refer to all Exchanges-both State and Federal-for purposes of the tax credits. If a State chooses not to follow the directive in Section 18031 to establish an Exchange, the Act tells the Secretary of Health and Human Services to establish "such Exchange." §18041. And by using the words "such Exchange," the Act indicates that State and Federal Exchanges should be the same. But State and Federal Exchanges would differ in a fundamental way if tax credits were available only on State Exchanges-one type of Exchange would help make insurance more affordable by providing billions of dollars to the States' citizens; the other type of Exchange would not. Several other provisions in the Act-e.g., Section 18031(i)(3)(B)'s requirement that all Exchanges create outreach programs to "distribute fair and impartial information concerning . . . the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B"-would make little sense if tax credits were not available on Federal Exchanges. 

The argument that the phrase "established by the State" would be superfluous if Congress meant to extend tax credits to both State and Federal Exchanges is unpersuasive. This Court's "preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute." Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U. S. 526, 536. And rigorous application of that canon does not seem a particularly useful guide to a fair construction of the Affordable Care Act, which contains more than a few examples of inartful drafting. The Court nevertheless must do its best, "bearing in mind the ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.' " Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 573 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 9-15. 

(c) Given that the text is ambiguous, the Court must look to the broader structure of the Act to determine whether one of Section 36B's "permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law." United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U. S. 365, 371. 

Here, the statutory scheme compels the Court to reject petitioners' interpretation because it would destabilize the individual insurance market in any State with a Federal Exchange, and likely create the very "death spirals" that Congress designed the Act to avoid. Under petitioners' reading, the Act would not work in a State with a Federal Exchange. As they see it, one of the Act's three major reforms-the tax credits-would not apply. And a second major reform-the coverage requirement-would not apply in a meaningful way, because so many individuals would be exempt from the requirement without the tax credits. If petitioners are right, therefore, only one of the Act's three major reforms would apply in States with a Federal Exchange.

The combination of no tax credits and an ineffective coverage requirement could well push a State's individual insurance market into a death spiral. It is implausible that Congress meant the Act to operate in this manner. Congress made the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements applicable in every State in the Nation, but those requirements only work when combined with the coverage requirement and tax credits. It thus stands to reason that Congress meant for those provisions to apply in every State as well. Pp. 15-19. 

(d) The structure of Section 36B itself also suggests that tax credits are not limited to State Exchanges. Together, Section 36B(a), which allows tax credits for any "applicable taxpayer," and Section 36B(c)(1), which defines that term as someone with a household income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty line, appear to make anyone in the specified income range eligible for a tax credit. According to petitioners, however, those provisions are an empty promise in States with a Federal Exchange. In their view, an applicable taxpayer in such a State would be eligible for a tax credit, but the amount of that tax credit would always be zero because of two provisions buried deep within the Tax Code. That argument fails because Congress "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions." Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U. S. 457. Pp. 19- 20. 

(e) Petitioners' plain-meaning arguments are strong, but the Act's context and structure compel the conclusion that Section 36B allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any Exchange created under the Act. Those credits are necessary for the Federal Exchanges to function like their State Exchange counterparts, and to avoid the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid. Pp. 20-21. 

759 F. 3d 358, affirmed. 

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KENNEDY, GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined. 

The Dissent

In Justice Scalia's Dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, he wastes no time in cutting the chase and setting forth the core of his disagreement with the Majority:

The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says "Exchange established by the State" it means "Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government." That is of course quite absurd, and the Court's 21 pages of explanation make it no less so. 

Page 1 of the Dissent


In summing up his dissent, Scalia admonishes that:

Today's opinion changes the usual rules of statutory interpretation for the sake of the Affordable Care Act. That, alas, is not a novelty. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U. S. ___, this Court revised major components of the statute in order to save them from unconstitutionality. The Act that Congress passed provides that every individual "shall" maintain insurance or else pay a "penalty." 26 U. S. C. §5000A. This Court, however, saw that the Commerce Clause does not authorize a federal mandate to buy health insurance. So it rewrote the mandate-cum-penalty as a tax. 567 U. S., at ___-___ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 15-45). The Act that Congress passed also requires every State to accept an expansion of its Medicaid program, or else risk losing all Medicaid funding. 42 U. S. C. §1396c. This Court, however, saw that the Spending Clause does not authorize this coercive condition. So it rewrote the law to withhold only the incremental funds associated with the Medicaid expansion. 567 U. S., at ___-___ (principal opinion) (slip op., at 45-58). Having transformed two major parts of the law, the Court today has turned its attention to a third. The Act that Congress passed makes tax credits available only on an "Exchange established by the State." This Court, however, concludes that this limitation would prevent the rest of the Act from working as well as hoped. So it rewrites the law to make tax credits available everywhere. We should start calling this law SCOTUScare. 

Perhaps the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act will attain the enduring status of the Social Security Act or the Taft-Hartley Act; perhaps not. But this Court's two decisions on the Act will surely be remembered through the years. The somersaults of statutory interpretation they have performed ("penalty" means tax, "further [Medicaid] payments to the State" means only incremental Medicaid payments to the State, "established by the State" means not established by the State) will be cited by litigants endlessly, to the confusion of honest jurisprudence. And the cases will publish forever the discouraging truth that the Supreme Court of the United States favors some laws over others, and is prepared to do whatever it takes to uphold and assist its favorites.