Time And Chance on Wall Street And A Customer's Belated Arbitration Complaint

July 27, 2016

There's this wonderful Old Testament quote from "Ecclesiastes" Chapter 9, Verse 11:

I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all.

When it comes to litigation, that biblical verse is spot on. Those who get to the courthouse first don't always win. Those represented by the best-educated and highest-priced lawyers don't always win. You can be the most intelligent and savvy guy in the world but if a jury doesn't believe you or a judge finds the legal theory of your case lacking, it ain't gonna help. 

In today's BrokeAndBroker.com Blog, we consider the case of a public customer Claimant who took his time to get to the starting line in terms of even filing his initial complaint. His attorney really worked hard at using whatever law and facts were at his disposal (and maybe even reaching a bit beyond his grasp). In the end, however, a panel of arbitrators concluded that the unhappy customer's time had run out and that Lady Luck was not smiling on him. Time and chance . . . indeed!

Case In Point

In a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") Arbitration Statement of Claim filed in November 2015, public customer Craiger asserted breaches of contract and of fiduciary duty, fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation, negligence, negligent supervision, and unjust enrichment. The FINRA Arbitration Decision asserts that "Claimant's statement of claim did not specify the securities at issue in this matter." Claimant sought between $100,000 and $500,000 in general damages and also sought punitive damages, special damages, and attorneys' fees. In the Matter of the FINRA Arbitration Between Timothy Craiger, Claimant, vs. Capital City Securities, LLC, Respondent (FINRA Arbitration 15-03150, July 13, 2016).

Respondent Capital City Securities generally denied the allegations and asserted various affirmative defenses.

Tick Tock

On April 12, 2016, Respondent Capital City Securities filed a Motion to Dismiss under FINRA Rule 12206: Time Limits, which imposes a so-called eligibility standard upon claims to the extent that:

(a) No claim shall be eligible for submission to arbitration under the Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim. The panel will resolve any questions regarding the eligibility of a claim under this rule.

Claimant opposed the Motion to Dismiss but after hearing oral arguments on the motion, the FINRA Arbitration Panel unanimously granted the motion and offered this explanation:

[I]n August 2008, Claimant transferred his account to Respondent, including all of its then holdings. Prior to this, Claimant's Broker, Michael Brigman ("Brigman"), worked for a firm called Regis Securities Corporation. Evidently Regis Securities went out of business and Brigman, along with apparently other representatives or associates working there, moved themselves and their customer's accounts to Respondent. Claimant's account value at the time he moved his business to Respondent's was $195,437.15, and consisted of a variety of securities according to the account statements appended to Respondent's supporting papers. Specifically, Claimant's account was made up of 6% cash, 37% U.S. Equities and 57% International Equities.

According to those same statements, Claimant purchased 2 securities marked solicited in his account on September 22, 2008-American International Group-2,000 shares at 5.48 and Yamana Gold, Inc.-1,000 shares at 10.55. At the same time, Claimant, on an unsolicited basis, sold 500 shares of Nordic American Tanker Shipping LTD at 34.88, apparently to raise some of the cash to make the purchases noted. (This security was sold at a $3,441.00 loss.) The account statements do not show any further purchases or sales of securities in Claimant's account at the Respondent's firm.

By the end of February 2009, Claimant's total account value had fallen to slightly more than $75,000.00; however, by August 8, 2009 when Claimant transferred his account to another firm-Chase, according to his counsel at the hearing on this motion, his account value had jumped to a little over $132,000.00.

Respondent is based in Columbus, Ohio and operates through a network of "independent" brokers/financial consultants. Claimant's financial consultant, Brigman, was at all times, according to the account statements, a resident of the State of Florida. At the hearing Respondent indicated that Brigman also had a residence in Michigan.

Claimant's Statement of Claim was filed on or about November 19, 2015, more than 6.25 years after Claimant transferred his account away from Respondent. On the face of it, it would appear that this action is clearly ineligible for arbitration under the 6 year eligibility rule, because why else would Claimant have transferred his account to another firm if, he in fact, was not unhappy with, and felt injured by (given his substantial overall losses), Respondent's alleged malfeasance or neglect. This appeared to be especially true on the face of Claimant's opposition papers which did not even address this issue, focusing instead on the date the purchases were made as the improper accrual date for purposes of the 6 year eligibility rule.

At the hearing, however, Claimant's counsel, without a supporting declaration from his client or any evidence whatsoever, averred that Claimant did not transfer his account because he was unhappy with Respondent or because he felt aggrieved. Instead, counsel offered the excuse that his client transferred out because his broker was not actively practicing as a broker anymore and because he was not licensed in the State of Florida, where he was in fact officed. While it appears on the surface that this averment raises more questions than it answers, the fact is that even the most unsophisticated investor would, or should have known, when his broker disclosed that he was not, or could not get, licensed in Florida (Respondent offered that Brigman could not get, or renew, his Florida State license because he failed to submit certified copies of documents relating to a domestic dispute but that he was, in fact, licensed in Michigan), that something was amiss-especially in view of the substantial losses Claimant's account statements revealed.

Notably, neither the Statement of Claim nor the opposition papers identify a single security purchased or sold through Respondent that was unsuitable or in breach of Respondent's asserted fiduciary duty. Nor did Claimant's papers attempt to show what happened to any of the securities Claimant did purchase through Respondent, or any of the other securities Claimant transferred over in an effort to prove Claimant actually suffered a loss. Claimant's counsel desperately argued, without a shred of evidentiary support, that Respondent is the alter ego of Regis Securities, Claimant's prior firm where Brigman once worked. He also argued, without citation to any legal authority, that Respondent could be held liable for the allegedly unsuitable securities his client purchased through Regis.

This all notwithstanding, Claimant never seriously addressed the fact that he transferred his account away from Respondent more than 6 years before he filed the Statement of Claim. Instead, he did nothing more than baldly insist that he was entitled to a full hearing on the merits because of facts he refused to disclose in any of his pleadings and because Brigman kept assuring him that "everything would be okay."

However, to this point, it is undisputed that Claimant transferred his account away from Brigman and Respondent in August 2009 and Claimant never suggested he continued to communicate with Brigman or Respondent, or rely on them, after the transfer. Indeed, he would have no justifiable reason to do so because he moved his account to another firm and another advisor and believed Brigman was not a practicing financial advisor any longer.

The evidence is overwhelming that this claim was filed more than 6 years after Claimant reasonably knew, or should have known, that he had been injured by the actions of Respondent's Firm.

Accordingly, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12206 is granted by the Panel without prejudice to any right the Claimant has to file in court; the Claimant is not prohibited from pursuing his claims in a court pursuant to Rule 12206(b) of the Code. . .

Bill Singer's Comment

Compliments to this FINRA Panel for an outstanding job. Given the arbitrators's substantive and eloquent explanation of their decision, I will only briefly touch on a few key issues.

As set forth in the Decision, the focus on the timeliness of Claimant's lawsuit starts with August 2008, when he transferred his account into Respondent Capital City. We then stand at the date of Claimant's filing of his FINRA Arbitration Statement of Claim, November 2015, and look back to 2008 -- a span of more than seven years.  Applying the six-year eligibility rule, it's tough to find any alleged misconduct by Respondent that fell within six years of the date of the filing of the claims. The minimal number of trades that took place while the transferred account was housed at Capital City concluded by September 2008. Moreover, a purportedly unhappy Claimant transferred his account out of Capital City in August 2009, a date that would still place the November 2015 filing of the Statement of Claim outside of the six-year eligibility period.


I got the sense that this Panel was somewhat annoyed with what may have come off for them as a case belatedly slapped together in an attempt to prompt a settlement. There is nothing necessarily wrong with that approach and, frankly, it's a fairly common tactic that often has its merits and often proves successful. Notwithstanding, consider the arbitrators's disapproving prose:

Notably, neither the Statement of Claim nor the opposition papers identify a single security purchased or sold through Respondent that was unsuitable or in breach of Respondent's asserted fiduciary duty. Nor did Claimant's papers attempt to show what happened to any of the securities Claimant did purchase through Respondent, or any of the other securities Claimant transferred over in an effort to prove Claimant actually suffered a loss. Claimant's counsel desperately argued, without a shred of evidentiary support, that Respondent is the alter ego of Regis Securities, Claimant's prior firm where Brigman once worked. He also argued, without citation to any legal authority, that Respondent could be held liable for the allegedly unsuitable securities his client purchased through Regis.

It is going to be virtually impossible for a lawyer to win a case when the triers-of-fact appraise your trial technique as "desperately argued, without a shred of evidentiary support . . . without citation to any legal authority . . ." Similarly, your case is likely going down in flames when it's found to be nothing more than an attempt to "baldly insist that he was entitled to a full hearing on the merits because of facts he refused to disclose in any of his pleadings  . . . "  

In the end, time and chance did a number on Claimant Craiger.

Also READ: "Tardy Customer Warps FINRA Arbitration Space Time Continuum" (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog, October 6, 2014)