AT-WILL DISCHARGE UNDER NEW YORK LAW. NO CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS RECEIVED ABOUT ALLEGED MISMARKING OF TRADES OR TWO ALLEGED TIME AND PRICE VIOLATIONS.
TO THE COURT: FINRA and the current majority of the panel, are offering a Hobson'sChoice to a pro se claimant. He was unable to hire counsel to represent him in a longevidentiary hearing following withdrawal, without explanation by the law firm thatrepresented him 3 weeks prior to the hearing, to try to retain counsel, and then to incur additional time and expense, merely to rubber stamp the entire panels' unanimous decision based on the record and pleadings before it. Besides a waste of the court's time, this process is not required as a matter of law in a FINRA Industry Dispute arbitration. The facts of this case also don't warrant court confirmation. The parties, and the panel after hearing, agree that there was no customer information at issue. The U5 drafted by Respondent Morgan Stanley so states. The panel unanimously found for the Respondent on all counts, except expungement, and did not award damages. It was not a case that involved wrongful termination practices, or that entailed discrimination or other violations of civil rights. The panels' unanimous expungement decision, reflected in paragraph 3.c. of what is termed the "Provisional Award" section of the award, was minimalist. It modified a well-crafted U5 statement by Respondent Morgan Stanley,designed to avoid a defamatory in nature claim, that was true at the time, but misrepresents the facts after the panel's decision. The Panel wanted it clearly stated in the Claimant's U5 that his was an at-will discharge under New York law, and not one "for cause", as alleged, in part, by the Respondent Morgan Stanley. This relief was consistent with that pled by the Claimant, as noted in paragraph (j) of the Relief Requested section of this award. It is ironic, that FINRA's Office of Dispute Resolution, whose purpose is to present a forum to encourage dispute resolutions, offered no compromises to its position, and never responded to the numerous compromises offered by the Chairperson. It did so despite FINRA's lack of legal authority to compel court confirmation of an arbitral award or to require a claimant to have his CRD records (including the U5 and U4) changed pursuant to an arbitral award without court confirmation. FINRA has stonewalled on compromise and on providing a duly promulgated Rule upon which its authority to compel court confirmation must be based in Industry Dispute arbitrations. Courts have likely assumed FINRA was not acting ultra vires in mandating such confirmations. This court need not do so.. . .A Panel cannot create legal authority FINRA does not have. It is not a matter of the Panel imposing its will on FINRA or conditioning an award. FINRA since 1999 could have created such authority by promulgating a Rule applicable to Industry Disputes as it did for Customer Disputes under Rule 2080. It has not, and the court should hold that the panel's award was self-executing and required no court confirmation of the award or to change the Claimant's CRD records even without any finding that the U5 was defamatory in nature.. . .At one point the then current majority thought we had FINRA's agreement to serve theAward with paragraph 5 and Mr. Brill's dissent, only with court confirmation as theparty(ies) agreed and without FINRA requiring or independently exercising a courtconfirmation right. The case administrator so stated in writing. As Chairperson inaccordance with the draft award presented I was to sign on behalf of all the Panelmembers, with Mr. Brill dissenting in part. I had the case administrator confirm to me in writing that Ms. Rutty agreed to sign the award as presented to me with paragraph 5 and Mr. Brill's dissent, and he did so in writing. I suggested to the case administratorthat Mr. Brill's dissent might be moot given FINRA's decision and asked him to inquire ifMr. Brill would drop his dissent. He did so. Mr. Brill then learned from the caseadministrator that FINRA was going to require court confirmation that contradicted theaward that I was to sign on behalf of the Panel. He subsequently confirmed to me inwriting that FINRA, in his opinion, had no intention of following the terms of theexecuted award and would require court confirmation contrary to it. He had advised the case administrator he would not sign on this basis, and subsequently advised me inwriting that he thought what FINRA was trying to do, through the case administrator,was an "abomination". Subsequently the case administrator sent an email to the Panelwith the same award, but with the email now highlighting that FINRA would be requiring court confirmation. This put the Panel back to square one. I worked with this case administrator before, and never had such a problem. I know he has asked FINRA"management" before acting on other matters in connection with this matter, but he has not revealed if anyone, but he orchestrated this ethically corrupt attempt to have me sign based on false pretense.Request of the CourtI request that the court dismiss as a matter of law FINRA's requirement for courtconfirmation of arbitral decisions and awards in Industry Dispute Arbitrations which arenot subject to Rule 13805 or Rule 13904 (b), and to do so specifically in this case, as amatter of fact and law. In so doing, the court should require FINRA, including FINRARAD, to immediately comply with the terms of paragraphs 1-4 of the presently termed"Provisional Award" and to have that term revised to be Award in the final award. Even if the court confirms the Panel's unanimous ruling or makes other findings, it is myrequest the FINRA be charged as set forth in the next paragraph.In recognition of the Claimant's pro se status, it is my additional request that FINRA becharged with all attorneys' fees and expenses, court costs and other related expensesfor both parties, or either party, as the case may be, and of those of any other persons, if any, compelled by the court to appear or give testimony, for FINRA's actions in connection with this dispute as set forth above. As the court deems appropriate it should also charge FINRA with a penalty for any action it deems ethically improper orotherwise egregious in conduct.
FINRA has stonewalled on compromise and on providing a duly promulgated Rule upon which its authority to compel court confirmation must be based in Industry Dispute arbitrations.I worked with this case administrator before, and never had such a problem. I know he has asked FINRA "management" before acting on other matters in connection with this matter, but he has not revealed if anyone, but he orchestrated this ethically corrupt attempt to have me sign based on false pretense.