DISSENTING ARBITRATOR'S REPORT
I disagree with my fellow Panelists as to the basis for dismissing in part the claims of
Claimant. I find that in dismissing the claims, they have done so on a basis that falls
outside the record.
Under the facts presented, this action was brought by Claimant to recover monetary
damages equal to the value of common stock which was not issued to him under a
stock incentive plan provided by the Respondent. Claimant entered into a term
employment agreement (made part of the record) which imposed various performance
obligations for his employment and after his contract expired. In addition to this,
Claimant and Respondent entered into a contract entitled a "JPI II Award Agreement" ("JPI Agreement"), which grants rights under an incentive program offered by Respondent to its employees, titled the "GFI Group Inc. 2008 Equity Incentive Plan" (as
amended and restated effective Feb. 7, 2013) (the "Incentive Program").
The JPI Agreement provides for a grant, made on a specific date stated at the top of the
agreement, of a specified amount of Restricted Stock Units (or "RSUs"); which is to
mean that on a date specified, the Respondent confirms that it has earmarked and set
aside from a pool a RSUs (which fund the Incentive Program) a specific amount of
those RSUs, which Respondent guarantees will be available to distribute as common
stock to Claimant on specified dates in the future. This is called the "Grant Date". At
signing there is no actual right to the common shares, nor even a right to a scheduled
distribution of those shares, it is simply a guarantee that, when the obligation to issue
common shares to the employee springs, the amount of RSUs declared in the
agreement shall be available and will be issued on the agreed-upon date of issuance (if
the employee is employed by that date).
On the effective Grant Date, pursuant to Section 3.1 of the JPI Agreement, there is a
time clock of 5 years set postponing the obligation of Respondent to issue common
shares to Claimant. At the end of this 5 year period (which is the 5th anniversary of the
Grant Date), the obligation of the Respondent to issue common shares to Claimant
springs, but on four equal annual issuance dates. In other words, on the
5th anniversary, there is no assignment of right to, or issuance of interest in, any
common stock of Respondent (as represented by the RSUs), but the obligation by
Respondent to issue common stock in equal amounts on specified dates. It is on those
dates of issuance on which a right to the ownership and title over the number of
common stock actually issued (equivalent to a fraction of the total number of RSUs
granted under the agreement) transfers to Claimant. Put more succinctly, under the JPI
Agreement, the Incentive Plan will issue stock to Claimant beginning on the 6th
anniversary, and Claimant will not receive the full incentive award under the Plan until
the 9
th anniversary (subject to Section 3 and 5 as will be explained).
Section 3 makes clear that on the 5th anniversary, if Claimant remains employed by
Respondent, issuance of common stock on the four annual dates are obligatory-
Respondent cannot refuse to change its decision to issue common stock on those days
as Claimant would have an absolute contractual right to be issued the common shares.
However, pursuant to Section 5.2, should Claimant not be employed by the Respondent
on the 5th anniversary of the grant, then all rights forfeit. As it is not contested as to
whether Claimant was employed on the fifth anniversary, Section 5.2 does not apply
and will not be addressed again.
Relevant to these matters is Section 5.3, which provides as follows: "If the [Claimant's]
employment with the [Respondent] . . . terminates for any reason after the [5th
anniversary] and prior to [the date on which common stock was to issue to Claimant],
the [right to be issued common stock] subject to this Agreement shall immediately be
cancelled and the [Claimant] . . . shall forfeit any rights and interest in and with respect to
[the common stock to be issued in the future] unless the [Respondent] determines, in its
sole and absolute discretion, that the [Claimant] is a Good Leaver." This language is
interpreted to state that if the Claimant's employment with Respondent has ended, and
the date it has ended comes after the 5th anniversary, but before a date on which
common stock was to issue, the Claimant no long has a right to receive, and the Respondent is no longer obligated to issue to Claimant, common stock except and
unless a precondition is met-that Respondent determines Claimant is a "Good
Leaver". Thus, based on this, issuance and right to receive common stock falls to the
discretion of the Respondent, and there no longer exists an absolute right. According to
testimony, that is how the program is customarily performed by the Respondent, and
how Claimant has enjoyed such performance under previous issuances of common
stock to him in the past. Thus, though there was some confusion based on the inartful
use of terminology and construction of the clauses in reliance of the terminology, and
some argument as to whether the terms as used may suggest some other form of
performance obligation by Respondent, evidence of the method by which the
Respondent uniformly performs under its incentive program, and how Claimant has
received benefit under it previously, leads only to the conclusion that the foregoing is
how this Incentive Program works, and how the JPI Agreements presented to the Panel
are performed.
It is undisputed that Claimant was employed by Respondent on the 5th anniversary.
However, Claimant's term employment contract automatically terminated as a
consequence of Claimant issuing a notice of non-renewal of his employment agreement
(per its terms). Notwithstanding this, Respondent continued Claimant's employment on
an at-will basis until he was subsequently terminated prior to the incentive awards
issuance dates. Respondent did not subsequently issue common stock awards to
Claimant on each of the subsequent issuance dates, and failed to communicate a
reason for its non-performance-leading to these proceedings.
Claimant's case in chief is to assert that he is entitled under the terms of the JPI
Agreement to receive stock under the Incentive Program. The essence of his claims are
Respondent either failed to perform as obligated under the JPI Agreement, or that
Respondent has breached that agreement by deeming him a "non-Good Leaver". Nonperformance, according to Claimant, was either Respondent's failure to make a
determination, or otherwise that Respondent failed to make issuance to him as a "Good
Leaver". If, however, Respondent deemed him a "non-Good Leaver" and used such a
determination as the basis for canceling his right to issuance of common stock, this
breached the JPI Agreement as Claimant was not terminated for cause and otherwise
complied with all of his contractual obligations to Respondent (including various noncompete and non-solicitation clauses in his employment agreement).
In my opinion, my fellow Panelists have made this award on three factors I believe to be
outside anything reflected in the record: (1) management always has the full right and
discretion to define ambiguous clauses and terms in any way it prefers (such, as, for
example, the definition of "Good Leaver"); (2) that the contract grants Respondent the
right (under Section 5.4) to indefinitely withhold a determination as to whether or not
Claimant is a "Good Leaver"; and (3) it is standard in the industry that when an
employee leaves a position with a company, that employee automatically forfeits any
right to any unpaid, unsettled or undistributed value of any kind. It is not just that I find
these conclusions unsupported by the record, but I find that they completely disregard
the nature of contracts as being a meeting of the minds of two parties, representing their
collective understanding of what are the rights and obligations of the other.
Furthermore, the Panel's determinations fail to consider the evidence (much of it offered
by Respondent) as to how Respondent applies the term "Good Leaver", generally and under the JPI Agreement. It also does not consider the language of the JPI Agreement
with regard to Respondent's obligations and actual discretions. I also find that the
Panel's considerations may well have changed the terms of the agreements made part
of the record-altering terms in one (the employment agreement) and inserting terms in
another (the JPI Agreement and Incentive Plan) without any signed writing to permit
these alterations.
Generally, the JPI Agreement is somewhat inartfully constructed. It uses terms which
have a common understanding and definition in the industry, and also have a plain
language understanding or definition which parallels the industry understanding as well.
Yet, the way in which the JPI Agreement makes use of the terms, confusion was
created during the Arbitration-especially since neither the JPI Agreement nor the
Incentive Program document provides a definition for the terms used. Notwithstanding
the inartful construction of the JPI Agreement, based on the evidence presented, which
includes testimony given by witnesses for both parties (including the Claimant himself),
performance under the contract is as described earlier, above; to wit: while Claimant is
an employee of Respondent, he has an absolute right to issuance of common stock on
a set schedule that begins on the 6th anniversary of execution if still employed by
Respondent. However, if his employment terminates for any reason before the 5th
anniversary, all right to future issuances is forfeit without recourse; if his employment
terminates after the 5th anniversary his right to future issuances forfeits except and
unless Respondent deems him a "Good Leaver". To be clear, there is no absolute right
to common stock by Claimant unless he is employed by Respondent at the time a
scheduled date of issuance occurs (and then only to what was to be issued that day).
Having resolved the process by which the JPI Agreement and the Incentive Program
are performed, the issue of the "Good Leaver" label just mentioned must now be
analyzed to determine if Respondent has breached its obligation under the JPI
Agreement by either non-performance or having made a bad faith determination of
Claimant's "Good Leaver" status.
The label "Good Leaver" is not defined in the JPI Agreement or in the Incentive Program
document, and the inartful means by which the JPI Agreement is constructed has left
open, it seems, an ambiguity as to the extent by which Respondent may exercise
discretion in defining the label and applying the label. Application of "Good Leaver"
under the JPI Agreement turns entirely on Section 5.3 and 5.4 of the JPI Agreement.
They make clear that if the Claimant, as a former employee, is deemed a "Good Leaver" by Respondent, then he shall be entitled to future issuance of Respondent's common
stock-though Respondent retains the right to change its mind and deem him a "non-Good Leaver" if circumstances have changed to cause the change in his "Good Leaver" status. What is and is not a "Good Leaver" are a central issue. However, before
analyzing how "Good Leaver" is intended to be used by the JPI Agreement, it must first
be resolved as to whether Respondent was obligated to make such a determination and
therefore failed to perform by withholding a determination.
Claimant asserts that Respondent was obligated under the JPI Agreement to make a
determination as to whether he was a "Good Leaver", and that Respondent failed to
perform this contractual obligation. Respondent asserts that the language of Section 5.3 and 5.4 gives it total discretion as to whether it must make any determination at all
as to whether Claimant is a "Good Leaver", and therefore may withhold indefinitely any
determination of "Good Leaver" status. This is primarily founded upon, according to
Respondent, the language of Section 5.4 which states that "[i]n the absence of an
affirmative decision by the [Respondent], the [Claimant] will not be treated as a Good
Leaver upon his termination of employment with the [Respondent] , , ," Respondent
asserts that this language grants it discretion to never make a determination (with the
consequence being, under Section 5.4, that Claimant will be treated as a "non_good
Leaver" and therefore ineligible for any issuance of any stock awards). I disagree. Not
only does this language fail to state a right to withhold a determination of "Good Leaver" status indefinitely, its use by the JPI Agreement also does not establish a right for the
Respondent, it actually operates as a parameter for determining "Good Leaver" status.
To wit:
Section 5.4 is not a separate term establishing a separate criterion for the exercise of
Respondent's rights when Claimant's employment terminates. In actuality, this section
is intended to establish the limiting parameters by which a determination of "Good Leaver" status will be made. This is obvious from the language in Section 5.3-in
particular, the parenthetical stating "as determined in accordance with Section 5.4
below". This parenthetical is stating that it is incorporating Section 5.4 by reference, and
that the label or status of "Good Leaver" will be applied to Claimant in the manner
described in Section 5.4.
When looking at Section 5.4, it first states that when determining if Claimant is a "Good Leaver" for Section 5.3 purposes, Respondent "shall have the sole and absolute
discretion to determine whether [Claimant] shall be considered to be a Good Leaver . . . "
(Emphasis added). By saying that Respondent has discretion to determine if Claimant "shall" be considered to be a Good Leaver", the JPI Agreement is requiring that a
determination be made. Whether or not Claimant "shall" be considered a "Good Leaver"
is what is left to Respondent's discretion, according to this sentence. It is not a
reservation of the right to elect not to make the decision at all, as Respondent had
asserted.
The foregoing also holds true for the latter portion of Section 5.4, which states that "i]n
the absence of an affirmative decision by the [Respondent], the [Claimant] will not be
treated as a "Good Leaver" upon his termination of employment with the
[Respondent] . . . " Whether this portion of Section 5.4 is read in a vacuum or in
conjunction with the former portion of Section 5.4, it in no way suggests the reservation
of right to never decide whether Claimant is a "Good Leaver", as Respondent asserted.
On its own, it merely states in plain English that while no decision has been made that
Claimant is a "Good Leaver", he will be treated as a "non-Good Leaver"-i.e. while
Respondent is deciding, no issuance will be made and no issuance can be compelled.
This is made even more clear when read in conjunction with the former portion of
Section 5.4.
Given the foregoing, when both parts of Section 5.4 are read together, and in the
context of Section 5.3 which incorporates it, what is being stated is that Respondent "shall" make a determination as to whether Claimant is a "Good Leaver" in order to establish any right to future issuance under the Incentive Plan, Claimant will be treated
as not a "Good Leaver" while that decision is being made, and whether Claimant is or is
not a "Good Leaver" is at Respondent's discretion.
Great debate was had over Section 5.3 and 5.4 as to its meaning. There was authority
also offered to support that the absence of a determination was legally enforceable
under New York law-authority I believe to be inapposite and misinterpreted by
Respondent. However, the foregoing analysis, arguments by Respondent and authority
offered by Respondent are ultimately academic because evidence at the Arbitration
establishes that the Respondent did in fact make a determination of "Good Leaver"
status, and applied that determination as its reasoning for considering Claimant a "nonGood Leaver", and for not issuing stock as per the JPI Agreement-facts I believe were
not considered for the final determination in this matter.
At the Arbitration, two executive leaders testified-one currently active, and the other no
longer with the Respondent. Each either have or had ultimate decision-making power
as to if and how "Good Leaver" status would be applied to any employee. When giving
testimony on Claimant's "Good Leaver" status, they focused on Claimant having gone
into the employ of a competitor. Each of them confirmed that working for a competitor
was a primary factor for "Good Leaver" status generally, and of particular relevance to
the Claimant and his claims in these proceedings. More poignantly, they each testified
that it is because Claimant went to work for an employer that competed with
Respondent that Claimant was not and could not be considered a "Good Leaver". In
fact, one of the witnesses (the currently active leader) was quite emphatic on the point,
going so far as to suggest that the proceedings were entirely unnecessary because,
having gone to work for a competitor, it was completely elemental that Claimant could
not be a "Good Leaver". This testimony, however, along with the testimony of the other
witnesses, expresses clearly that Respondent had, in fact, made a determination as to
Claimant's "Good Leaver" status; that Respondent deemed him a "non-Good Leaver"
because he went to work for a competitor, and that he therefore forfeited his right to
issuance of common stock under the JPI Agreement. Thus, whether Respondent has
the right to withhold a determination or not is academic because Respondent clearly
made one. As such, it now becomes necessary to analyze if that determination was
made in accordance with the JPI Agreement, or otherwise in good faith with the terms of
the JPI Agreement.
What does "Good Leaver" mean? As stated earlier, there is no definition for this term in
the JPI Agreement or in the Incentive Plan. Where a term of a contract is ambiguous,
extrinsic evidence (i.e. parole evidence) is always accepted to help decipher and
determine how the parties-not the Panel-understand the term to mean. Based on the
testimony and evidence given, it does not appear that the parties are divided on how "Good Leaver" is defined.
Great emphasis was made by Respondent on the lack of definition, and on the
discretions held in Section 5.3 and 5.4 of the JPI Agreement, to represent that
Respondent retained the right to define "Good Leaver" however they wished.
Notwithstanding the fact that such a position is repugnant under the law (emphasizing
more the error of the Panel in its determination), it is not necessary to dive deep to find
that Respondent has acted contrary to its own analysis for holding Claimant to be a "non-Good Leaver".
At the Arbitration and in the testimony offered by the Respondent's witnesses (which
included another high-level executive who offered how Respondent would typically
analyze "Good Leaver" status), it was understood that Respondent deemed Claimant a
"non-Good Leaver" on the basis of his having entered into employment with a
competitor. However, the testimony offered by Respondent's witnesses established
that employment with a competitor alone would not cause a terminated employee to be
deemed a "Good Leaver". According to testimony, employees have gone to work for
competitors and have been deemed a "Good Leaver" when they do so in accordance
with "other agreements" that establish the parameters for entering into the employ of a
competitor, "holding up their end of the bargain"-this is the distilled testimony given by
Respondent's witnesses (with each quoted phrase reflective of the words used by the
witnesses). If the Panel is to take the witnesses at their word, then the evidence offered
by Respondent should support that Claimant should be considered a "Good Leaver";
that the Respondent's decision to consider Claimant a "non-Good Leaver" was an
abuse of its discretion under Section 5.4, or an exercise made in bad faith.
Under the undisputed facts of this matter, when Claimant's employment terminated, he
complied with all aspects of his various agreements offered into evidence-the JPI
Agreement and his employment agreement. No claim was made, or evidence offered,
by Respondent that Claimant violated any term of his agreements with Respondent. In
particular, as it pertains to Respondent's determination that Claimant was a "non-Good
Leaver" for having entered into the employ of a competitor, there was no claim or
evidence provided that Claimant violated the non-compete clause of his employment
agreement, which restrained Claimant from working for a competitor to Respondent for
a period of 6 months. Respondent did argue that all other agreements not the JPI
Agreement are separate and not to be considered within the context of the JPI
Agreement, however this argument lacks merit. To understand what are the obligations
of a contracting party, the underlying contract must be reviewed for definitions of the
obligations. Where there is a lack of such defined obligations or an ambiguity as to
what are the limits of any obligations-as there was in the JPI Agreement-other
evidence must be reviewed to understand how the parties understood the terms of the
JPI Agreement. Such evidence was offered, and the most poignant was the
Respondent's witness testimony.
Over and over again, Respondent, by its witnesses, testified that Claimant's having
entered into the employ of a competitor made him a "non-Good Leaver" for purposes of
the terms of the JPI Agreement. Yet, nothing in the JPI Agreement defines that entering
into the employ of a competitor should impose a "non-Good Leaver" status.
Respondent argued that this lack of clarity in the JPI Agreement allows it to define a
"Good Leaver" however it likes, including that employment with a competitor constitutes
"non-Good Leaver" status. However, Respondent's witnesses also testified that
entering into the employ of a competitor would not cause a former employee to be
considered a "non-Good Leaver" if such were to occur in accordance with "other
agreements", holding up "his end of the bargain". Therefore, the Respondent has
established that simply entering into the employ of a competitor is not alone a basis for
being labeled a "non-Good Leaver".
There is evidence of "other agreements" between the parties which apply to Claimant's
employ with a competitor, the Claimant's employment agreement, which sets a noncompete restriction for a period of 6 months. It is undisputed that he complied with this
and every other post-employment restriction in his employment agreement-and in
every other agreement offered into evidence. As such, the evidence shows that
Claimant "held up his end of the bargain" as established with "other agreements"
between the parties, and therefore to deem him to be a "non-Good Leaver" was an
abuse of Respondent's discretion to determine Claimant a "non-Good Leaver", and that
their determination was made in bad faith as a means to avoid the obligation to issue
him the common stock due him under the terms of the JPI Agreement. To determine
otherwise disregards the terms of the JPI Agreement, ignores the evidence offered by
both parties (and in particular by the Respondent), and makes the agreement not only
illusory but would also operate to increase the Claimant's non-compete restriction in his
employment agreement by implying that the common stock issuance schedule doubles
as a further restrictive covenant on competing employment (which would be an act to
change the agreements).