at Page 2 of the MSJC Opiniona showing that the respondent failed without good cause "to respond to requests for information by Bar Counsel or the [board of bar overseers] made in the course of the processing of a complaint."2 S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3 (1). The respondent alleged that he "DID COMPLY, and DID PROVIDE AN ANSWER, and my answer was provided in a form of SILENCE. (BOOM SHAKALAKA)." He also stated that, to the extent an answer was required, he "formally den[ied], and demand[ed] a Jury Trial."= = = = =Footnote 2: By letter dated February 20, 2019, bar counsel provided to the respondent a copy of a Federal District Court judge's order, and a transcript of a hearing in that court. The respondent represented the plaintiffs in that matter. Bar counsel indicated that the materials raised questions of professional misconduct, and requested the respondent to respond, with supporting documentation. He was asked to provide, among other things, the names and contact information for plaintiffs not identified by name in the Federal litigation; the dates of his engagement, engagement letters, and fee agreements; the dates of his last communication with the plaintiffs; identifying information concerning other litigation involving the plaintiffs; identifying information concerning cases in which he had been removed as counsel or ordered not to speak to particular parties; cases in which he had been sued for malpractice or otherwise; and cases in which he had appeared as counsel since 2016.The respondent did not produce any of the requested documents. He did not assert that any one or more of bar counsel's requests sought records that were not within the scope of the required records doctrine. See Matter of Kenney, 399 Mass. 431, 438 (1987).
at Page 3 of the MSJC Opinion[S]ilence in the face of bar counsel's request for information is not, as the respondent claims, a "response" categorically protected by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. . . .
NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR JURISTSNational Academy For Jurists ("NAFJ") awards the honorary law doctorate De Lex Doctorate ("D.L.D.") to legal scholars concerned with civil rights & civil liberties within the U.S. Courts; a specialized lawyer - Jurist for Justice.. . .DISCLAIMERChief Jurist for Justice is not licensed with any BAR and does not practice law. He seeks to be appointed as a unique U.S. Court Officer in charge of enforcing civil rights & civil liberties within the U.S. Courts; and attain injunctions against judges who fail to uphold their oath. In order to cure presence of impartiality, avoide bias, and maintain abiilty to prosecute U.S. officer before, ability to remove cases and maintain indipendence requires a non-public entity, and to prevent deterioration of justice over time, pursuant to need for justice within the U.S. court for the people for profit by National Academy For Jurists subject to Congress oversigh give people justice Honorary De Lex Doctorate ("D.L.D.") is the law doctorate conferred by National Academy for Jurists ("NAFJ") to Jurists for Justice, are required to adhere to the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct ("Mass. R. Pro. C.") promulgated by SJC Rule 3:07, as amended October 1st, 2018. Jurists for Justice hold themselves out as a legal expert in and writing of law, and must be able to demonstrate such skill pursuant to Mass. R. Pro. C. Rule 7.4(b). NAFJ, pursuant to Mass. R. Pro. C. Rule 7.4(c)(2) is a "private organization, whose standards for [granting the D.L.D.] are not regulated by a state authority or the American Bar Association." Pursuant to Mass. R. Pro. C. Rule 7.1, Comment , this is a for profit entity with donations made at disrection of Ilya Liviz. At all times, pro bono, private work, or any type of practice of law, is governed and subject to the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court, and the jurist shall list with their signature the state's BBO#. Pursuant to Mass. R. Pro. C. Rule 8.5(a) the disciplinary authority may vary depending the jurisdiction the jurist advocates before. . . .
I. SYNOPSIS1. America is built on capitalistic roots; American economy can't grow, when there are oprriessive restrictions in-place, inter alia, FINRA has promulgated unfair and monopolistic restrictions against Americans..
SIDE BAR: Readers are directed to the Complaint for its extensive allegations pertaining to the 30 claims set forth against Defendant FINRA, which, inter alia, include a Class Action, antitrust, unfair competition, National Labor Relations Act, fair labor standards, and others.Similarly, readers are directed to FINRA Rule 4210: Margin Requirements https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/4210 for a detailed explanation of the regulator's Pattern Day Trading minimum $25,000 equity requirement.
Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of a class of individuals who allegedly are subjected to unfair and deceptive regulations promulgated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Plaintiff is not an attorney, and therefore, he may not represent the interests of others in this court or represent a class of plaintiffs. See Tracy v. Kratovil, 798 F. App'x 665 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (per curiam); DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Daigle v. Karnes, No. 10-1264, 2010 WL 3294069, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2010). Accordingly, the Court will grant the application to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss the complaint without prejudice, and deny the motion for injunctive relief as moot. An Order is issued separately. . . .
For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is herebyORDERED that the plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis  is GRANTED; it isFURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief  is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it isFURTHER ORDERED that the complaint and this civil action are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.This is a final appealable Order.SO ORDERED.