3. Lewis' scheme was essentially to defraud approximately thirteen elderly investors located in the greater Green Bay area (the "Clients") as follows:

a. Lewis convinced the Clients to transfer their money to Fidelity where she falsely claimed that she was employed as an account representative who was paid by commission for each account established.

b. Lewis created or assisted Clients in creating an individual investment account with Fidelity, thereby, obtaining the Client's personal account information, including passwords.

c. Lewis then created joint Fidelity accounts under her name and that of the Client, often without the Client's knowledge and consent. Lewis created these accounts via the internet and linked them to the Client's individual account. Lewis intentionally misrepresented her identity in the creation of some accounts, for example, falsely describing herself as the niece of one Client.

d. Lewis then misappropriated the Clients money by transferring funds from the Clients personal accounts to the Lewis/Client joint account and then to one of Lewis' personal accounts. This was done without the Clients knowledge or consent and was not pursuant to any legitimate investment being made on behalf of the Clients.

e. Lewis also made unauthorized account transfers of Client funds in order to fraudulently withdraw Client funds by forging the Client's signature on checks drawn on that account. Lewis used the funds for personal expenditures and other expenses unrelated to the Client's purported investment.

f. Without authorization, Lewis applied for and received debit cards from Fidelity that were associated with a Client's individual account or the joint Lewis/Client accounts. Lewis then used the debit card to withdraw funds without permission from the accounts and make personal expenditures.

g. Lewis used the Client's funds to, among other things: (a) pay back previous Clients who requested access to their money; (b) purchase a 2013 Chevrolet Camaro; (c) gamble at local casinos; (d) pay personal expenses including credit card bills, and make cash payments to herself; and (e) pay for elective surgery for a friend.

h. In order to continue and prevent her scheme from being detected, Lewis had Client account statements sent exclusively to her address. Lewis also sent fictitious account statements and documents to Clients that misrepresented the value or existence of the Client portfolio.

i. Lewis also spoke telephonically with Fidelity account representatives and falsely identified herself as a Client in order to make unauthorized transfers or changes to Client accounts.

j. When Lewis did pay a Client, she did so with another Client's money, furthering the illusion that she was acting as an account representative who was earning actual returns for the Client.

4. As a result of the scheme, Lewis wrongfully obtained funds in excess of $1,000,000.

Defendant Lisa A. Lewis was indicted on multiple counts of wire fraud in violation of 13 U.S.C. § 1343 after embezzling in excess of two million dollars from at least thirteen elderly investors. She entered a guilty plea to one count, and on June 11, 2014, was sentenced to fifteen years in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and three years of supervised release. Lewis appealed, but "challenge[d] only the district court's imposition of certain conditions of supervised release, including a special condition of supervised release imposing a payment schedule for restitution that differed materially from the condition orally pronounced at sentencing." (ECF No. 51-1.) The parties agreed that the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded in light of the Seventh Circuit's decisions in United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368 (2015). Based upon the agreement of the parties, the Court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. Claiming that the government's original sentencing argument violated the plea agreement, Lewis has now filed a motion seeking various forms of additional relief including reassignment of the case to a new sentencing judge, striking the Guideline calculation section from the Pre-Sentence Report (PSR), striking the government's sentencing memorandum from the record, and sealing or otherwise shielding the sentencing transcript and any other evidence of the court's sentencing decision from the newly assigned judge. For the reasons that follow, Lewis' motion will be denied.

1. The appellate court found that the trial court did not err when it refused to hear Lewis's argument.
2. The appellate court found that the trial court die err, however, when it failed to affirmatively acknowledge that it had the authority to refuse to hear Lewis's argument.

1. In the alternative, EDWI rejected Lewis's argument
2. Because 7Cir found Lewis's argument to be meritlees, the appellate court deemed as "harmless," EDWI's error in not affirmatively acknowledging that it had the authority to refuse to hear Lewis's argument.

FINRA found that from August 2006 until her fraud was discovered in May 2013, Lewis was running a conversion scheme by targeting former customers from another brokerage firm from which she had been fired. Lewis told the victims she was a Fidelity broker and urged them to establish accounts at the firm and also established joint accounts with her victims in which she was listed as an owner. She eventually established more than 50 accounts and converted assets from a number of these accounts for her own personal benefit. In June 2014, Lewis pleaded guilty to wire fraud, and was sentenced to 15 years in prison and was ordered to pay more than $2 million in restitution to her victims.

FINRA found that Fidelity failed to detect or adequately follow up on multiple "red flags" related to Lewis's scheme. For example, though Lewis' victims were unrelated to one another, their various accounts shared a number of common identifiers tying them all to Lewis, such as a common email address, physical address or phone number. Fidelity also failed to detect Lewis' consistent pattern of money movements and overlooked red flags in telephone calls handled by its customer-service call center in which there were indications that Lewis was impersonating or taking advantage of her senior investor victims.

Brad Bennett, FINRA's Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement, said, "Protection of senior investors is a core mission for FINRA and why we started the FINRA Securities Helpline for Seniors. This case is a reminder to firms to ensure their supervisory systems and procedures are designed to protect senior investors from harm and to adequately follow-up on red flags to detect potential fraudulent account activity."

FINRA also found that Fidelity's inadequate supervisory systems and procedures contributed to the failure to detect and prevent Lewis's fraudulent activities. Though Fidelity maintained a report designed to identify common email addresses shared across multiple accounts, it failed to implement procedures regarding the report's use and dedicate adequate resources to the review and investigation of the reports. As a result, there was a backlog in reviewing thousands of reports, including a report in March 2012 showing that Lewis' email address was associated with dozens of otherwise unrelated accounts. The report was not reviewed by anyone at Fidelity until April 2013, more than a year after it was generated.

Since the unlawful acts of Lisa Lewis have come to light, Fidelity has taken a number of corrective actions to enhance its supervision, monitoring and surveillance.

As a complement to its existing extensive surveillance, Fidelity has implemented two new systems. The first is multi-wire destination surveillance. This surveillance, which was already in development during the time of Lewis' misconduct, is aimed at identifying and preventing precisely the type of scheme perpetrated by Lewis.

Second, Fidelity has implemented elder financial exploitation surveillance. This system monitors for a variety of different types of money movement in accounts owned by elder customers, and is aimed at identifying and preventing the kind of activity in which Lewis engaged.

In addition, since Lewis' unlawful acts, Fidelity has enhanced its existing associate and employee training and awareness relating to senior investors generally, and elder financial exploitation specifically. Fidelity implements various techniques, training and programs to help its representatives identify and appropriately respond to instances of potential elder financial exploitation.