• $1,700.00 Member Surcharge;
• $3,250.00 Member Process Fee;
• $1,125 Postponement Fee;
• $400.00 Discovery-related motion fees; and
• $7,537.50 of the hearing session fees

• $1,425 Filing Fee;
• $1,125 Postponement Fee;
• $800.00 of the discovery-related motion fees; and
• $7,537.50 of the hearing session fees

TO THE COURT: FINRA and the current majority of the panel, are offering a Hobson's

Choice to a pro se claimant. He was unable to hire counsel to represent him in a long

evidentiary hearing following withdrawal, without explanation by the law firm that

represented him 3 weeks prior to the hearing, to try to retain counsel, and then to incur additional time and expense, merely to rubber stamp the entire panels' unanimous decision based on the record and pleadings before it. Besides a waste of the court's time, this process is not required as a matter of law in a FINRA Industry Dispute arbitration. The facts of this case also don't warrant court confirmation. The parties, and the panel after hearing, agree that there was no customer information at issue. The U5 drafted by Respondent Morgan Stanley so states. The panel unanimously found for the Respondent on all counts, except expungement, and did not award damages. It was not a case that involved wrongful termination practices, or that entailed discrimination or other violations of civil rights. The panels' unanimous expungement decision, reflected in paragraph 3.c. of what is termed the "Provisional Award" section of the award, was minimalist. It modified a well-crafted U5 statement by Respondent Morgan Stanley,designed to avoid a defamatory in nature claim, that was true at the time, but misrepresents the facts after the panel's decision. The Panel wanted it clearly stated in the Claimant's U5 that his was an at-will discharge under New York law, and not one "for cause", as alleged, in part, by the Respondent Morgan Stanley. This relief was consistent with that pled by the Claimant, as noted in paragraph (j) of the Relief Requested section of this award. It is ironic, that FINRA's Office of Dispute Resolution, whose purpose is to present a forum to encourage dispute resolutions, offered no compromises to its position, and never responded to the numerous compromises offered by the Chairperson. It did so despite FINRA's lack of legal authority to compel court confirmation of an arbitral award or to require a claimant to have his CRD records (including the U5 and U4) changed pursuant to an arbitral award without court confirmation. FINRA has stonewalled on compromise and on providing a duly promulgated Rule upon which its authority to compel court confirmation must be based in Industry Dispute arbitrations. Courts have likely assumed FINRA was not acting ultra vires in mandating such confirmations. This court need not do so.

. . .

A Panel cannot create legal authority FINRA does not have. It is not a matter of the Panel imposing its will on FINRA or conditioning an award. FINRA since 1999 could have created such authority by promulgating a Rule applicable to Industry Disputes as it did for Customer Disputes under Rule 2080. It has not, and the court should hold that the panel's award was self-executing and required no court confirmation of the award or to change the Claimant's CRD records even without any finding that the U5 was defamatory in nature.

. . .

At one point the then current majority thought we had FINRA's agreement to serve the

Award with paragraph 5 and Mr. Brill's dissent, only with court confirmation as the

party(ies) agreed and without FINRA requiring or independently exercising a court

confirmation right. The case administrator so stated in writing. As Chairperson in

accordance with the draft award presented I was to sign on behalf of all the Panel

members, with Mr. Brill dissenting in part. I had the case administrator confirm to me in writing that Ms. Rutty agreed to sign the award as presented to me with paragraph 5 and Mr. Brill's dissent, and he did so in writing. I suggested to the case administrator

that Mr. Brill's dissent might be moot given FINRA's decision and asked him to inquire if

Mr. Brill would drop his dissent. He did so. Mr. Brill then learned from the case

administrator that FINRA was going to require court confirmation that contradicted the

award that I was to sign on behalf of the Panel. He subsequently confirmed to me in

writing that FINRA, in his opinion, had no intention of following the terms of the

executed award and would require court confirmation contrary to it. He had advised the case administrator he would not sign on this basis, and subsequently advised me in

writing that he thought what FINRA was trying to do, through the case administrator,

was an "abomination". Subsequently the case administrator sent an email to the Panel

with the same award, but with the email now highlighting that FINRA would be requiring court confirmation. This put the Panel back to square one. I worked with this case administrator before, and never had such a problem. I know he has asked FINRA

"management" before acting on other matters in connection with this matter, but he has not revealed if anyone, but he orchestrated this ethically corrupt attempt to have me sign based on false pretense.

Request of the Court

I request that the court dismiss as a matter of law FINRA's requirement for court

confirmation of arbitral decisions and awards in Industry Dispute Arbitrations which are

not subject to Rule 13805 or Rule 13904 (b), and to do so specifically in this case, as a

matter of fact and law. In so doing, the court should require FINRA, including FINRA

RAD, to immediately comply with the terms of paragraphs 1-4 of the presently termed

"Provisional Award" and to have that term revised to be Award in the final award. Even if the court confirms the Panel's unanimous ruling or makes other findings, it is my

request the FINRA be charged as set forth in the next paragraph.

In recognition of the Claimant's pro se status, it is my additional request that FINRA be

charged with all attorneys' fees and expenses, court costs and other related expenses

for both parties, or either party, as the case may be, and of those of any other persons, if any, compelled by the court to appear or give testimony, for FINRA's actions in connection with this dispute as set forth above. As the court deems appropriate it should also charge FINRA with a penalty for any action it deems ethically improper or

otherwise egregious in conduct.