The South Park Gnomes had Phase 1: Collect Underpants. The Gnomes had Phase 3: Profit. What the Gnomes never had -- could never quite figure out -- was Phase 2: How do you manage to turn a profit from stolen underpants? In a recent lawsuit brought by a former Wells Fargo employee, the defendants wanted the court to find that there was an enforceable arbitration agreement. They had some Forms U4. They had FINRA's rulebook. They also had a former regulator called NASD and a former employer whose name had changed. Problem was, where the hell was Phase 2?
[B]erry alleged that, in 2014, Appellants forced him to resign from his position as a
Wealth Manager and Senior Vice President with Wells Fargo Advisors.3 He
claimed this was in retaliation for his challenges to changes in his compensation
arrangement and his refusal to participate in an allegedly illegal cross-selling
program. In addition, Berry alleged that in 2016, he learned Wells Fargo Advisors
had filed a Form U5 termination notice, which appeared on his official record. The
Form U5 stated Wells Fargo Advisors had permitted him to resign, and it noted
that his branch office manager had discovered several binders of customer
information in the trunk of Berry's vehicle.
= = = = =
Footnote 3: Berry stated he joined the brokerage firm of "Wheat Butcher Singer" in 1994; in
1997, First Union Corporation acquired Wheat Butcher Singer, and the firm
became "Wheat First Union"; in 2001, the firm's parent company merged with
Wachovia Corporation, and its name changed to "Wachovia Securities"; finally, in
2008, "Wells Fargo" acquired "Wachovia," and the retail brokerage changed to
"Wells Fargo Advisors" in 2009. Berry asserted that due to the 2009 acquisition,
he became an employee of Wells Fargo Clearing Services, LLC, formerly known
as Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC, and its parent company, Wachovia Securities
Financial Holdings, LLC (collectively, Wells Fargo Advisors).
at Page 2 of the 2021 Opinion
Motion to Compel FINRA Arbitration
In response to Berry's state lawsuit, the Appellants moved to dismiss/stay the state court proceeding and sought to compel FINRA arbitration. In support of the Motion to Compel, Appellants submitted to the South Carolina Circuit Court:
a
supporting memorandum, three Forms U4, and the affidavit of Beverly W.
Jackson. The three Forms U4 were dated November 5, 1994, January 16, 1995, and September 28, 1995, respectively. Each form included the following
language:
I agree to arbitrate any dispute, claim, or controversy that
may arise between me and my firm, or a customer, or any
other person, that is required to be arbitrated under the
rules, constitutions, or by-laws of the organizations
indicated in Item 10 as may be amended from time to
time . . . .
at Pages 2 -3 of the 2021 Opinion
NASD? What's that got to do with FINRA?
In considering the motions before it, the Circuit Court entertained the following during its hearing [Ed: footnotes omitted]:
Appellants argued brokers
wishing to work in the securities industry must sign a Form U4, register with and
be licensed through FINRA, and abide by FINRA's rules. They asserted Berry
completed a Form U4 in 1994 when he began working for the predecessor entity
and the arbitration provision contained within the form was binding upon Berry
and Wells Fargo Advisors. In addition, Appellants argued Berry was a registered
representative or associated person under FINRA and that FINRA Rule 13200(A) bound the parties to arbitration.
Berry neither admitted nor denied that he was registered with FINRA or that he
was a registered associate of Wells Fargo Advisors. He argued Appellants, as the
parties seeking to compel arbitration, failed to satisfy their burden to prove that FINRA rules applied, that Berry was registered with FINRA, or that an agreement
to arbitrate existed. Berry argued Jackson's affidavit was insufficient to
authenticate the Forms U4 and Appellants were not parties to any of the forms. In
addition, Berry asserted the form designated SROs that no longer operated
arbitration forums. He agreed that there was a "consolidation" of the NASD and
NYSE arbitration forums in 2007, and he conceded the new entity became FINRA.
However, Berry contended neither NASD nor NYSE continued to operate a
separate arbitration forum and the court could not substitute FINRA for NASD in
the agreement. He acknowledged FINRA operated an arbitration forum but
asserted the arbitration clause in the Form U4 failed because Item 10 did not
include FINRA as a possible forum.
In response, Appellants suggested the court take judicial notice that, in the
mid-2000s, NASD turned over its responsibilities for the regulation of the financial
services industry, broker-dealers, and brokers to, and "essentially morphed" into, a
newly created entity called FINRA. In addition, Appellants argued it was routine
in the financial industry for disputes of this nature to proceed to arbitration and that
they were entitled to enforce the arbitration agreement contained in the Forms U4
because Berry laid out the "transformation" of Wheat First Securities into Wells
Fargo Advisors.
at Pages 3 -4 of the 2021 Opinion
No Substitutions
Following the hearing, the Circuit Court issued an Order denying Appellants' Motion to Stay/Compel because:
(1)
Appellants did not properly authenticate the forms; (2) the three Forms U4 did not
satisfy Appellants' burden to prove the existence of an agreement by Berry to
arbitrate his dispute with Appellants; and (3) even assuming an arbitration
agreement arose between the parties by virtue of the 1994 Form U4, the agreement
was void because the arbitration forums specified in the agreement no longer
existed. Specifically, the circuit court concluded the 1994 and 1995 Forms U4 did
not establish an agreement to arbitrate because Appellants were not parties to the
forms. The court reasoned that the predecessor, Wheat First, was the named firm
on the forms, and the forms contained no language stating that an arbitration
obligation would extend to successors or assigns of that firm. The court noted that
even if it were appropriate to take judicial notice of FINRA Rule 13200,
Appellants failed to show it applied to Berry such that it would bind him to its
arbitration procedure. The court concluded the selection of the designated forums
constituted an integral term of the arbitration clause in the 1994 form. It found that
because none of the identified forums existed and Appellants failed to show the court could simply substitute FINRA as a forum, the arbitration agreement was
impossible to perform and void.
at Page 4 of the 2021 Opinion
Appeal to South Carolina Court of Appeals
After the Circuit Court denied Appellants' motion for reconsideration, they appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, where two issues were cited:
1. Did the circuit court err by refusing to reconsider its order denying the motion to
compel arbitration when Appellants submitted an affidavit and newly discovered
evidence showing Berry agreed to arbitrate his claims?
2. Did the circuit court err by denying the motion to compel arbitration when
public records and FINRA rules established Berry was obligated to arbitrate his
claims against Appellants as a condition of his admitted registration with FINRA?
at Page 5 of the 2021 Opinion
None So Blind As . . .
The Court of Appeals found that the [Ed: footnote omitted]:
circuit court abused its discretion by excluding the 1994 and 1995
Forms U4 submitted with the motion to compel based on Rule 901(a), SCRE. Jackson attested that, as a paralegal of Wells Fargo & Company, she had "access to
certain personnel records of current and former employees . . . and related
corporate entities." In addition, she stated "[t]he [attached] Form U4 for Mr. Berry
show[ed] that he was employed by Wheat First Securities Inc. at the time of its
filing." We acknowledge Jackson's affidavit did not explain what a Form U4 was,
identify the actual custodian of the document, or indicate that it was a true and
correct copy. However, because the burden to authenticate is low, we find the
foregoing was sufficient to satisfy Rule 901, SCRE, and the circuit court erred by
excluding these documents. . . .
at Page 7 of the 2021 Opinion
You Leave Us "No Choice" (of forum)
Having opened the door for the possibility of reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals quickly slams the portal shut and found that the Forms U4 did not create an enforceable agreement among the parties to arbitrate:
We find the failure of the choice of forum invalidated the agreements contained in
the 1994 and 1995 Forms U4. Here, all three of the Forms U4 Appellants
submitted with their motion to compel arbitration listed "Wheat First Securities,
Inc." as the firm name, and the only SROs selected were the ASE, NASD, NYSE,
and PHLX. Even if any of these SROs still existed, the parties did not dispute they
no longer provided arbitration services. We find the arbitration forum was a
material and integral term of the agreement, and because the indicated
organizations no longer existed or provided arbitration services, there was no
enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
Further, we find none of the Forms U4 established an agreement to arbitrate
between Berry and Appellants. First, the agreements contained in the 1994 and
1995 Forms U4 were between Berry and a firm that no longer existed, and they
contained no language binding successors or assigns to the named firm.
Appellants, therefore, could not enforce any purported agreement to arbitrate
contained therein. Second, the 1999 and 2014 Forms U4 that Appellants submitted
with their motion to reconsider likewise failed to establish an enforceable
agreement to arbitrate between Berry and Appellants. Jackson's affidavit stated
"Wachovia Securities Financial Holdings, Inc." was the parent company of Wells
Fargo Clearing Services, LLC, formerly known as Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC,
and an "indirect subsidiary of Wells Fargo & Company." She attested "Wheat
First Securities, Inc." was "the predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo Advisors,
LLC" and gave the history of the mergers and acquisitions that resulted in the
creation of this entity. The 1999 Form U4 designated "Everen Securities" as the
firm name and contained the same arbitration clause that was included on the
1994 and 1995 Forms U4. However, this form contained no language indicating it
bound successors and assigns to the named firm. Further, FINRA was not yet in
existence and therefore was not included as an SRO on the 1999 Form U4.
Finally, the 2014 Form U4 designated Wells Fargo Advisors as the firm and
FINRA as an SRO, but it contained no arbitration agreement. Therefore, although
we acknowledge the 2014 form indicated Berry was registered with FINRA in
2014, we find neither the 1999 nor the 2014 form established Berry agreed to
arbitrate his claims against Appellants. . . .
at Page 9 of the 2021 Opinion
FINRA Rule 13200
The Appellants argued that even if the Forms U4 had not established an enforceable arbitration agreement that a separate basis for same was promulgated under FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes Rule 13200: Required Arbitration, which states:
(a) Generally
Except as otherwise provided in the Code, a dispute must be arbitrated under the Code if the dispute arises out of the business activities of a member or an associated person and is between or among:
Members;
Members and Associated Persons; or
Associated Persons.
(b) Insurance Activities
Disputes arising out of the insurance business activities of a member that is also an insurance company are not required to be arbitrated under the Code.
The Circuit Court declined to find that Rule 13200 was a stand-alone basis for an enforceable arbitration agreement among the parties [Ed: footnotes omitted]:
Even assuming Berry was registered as an associated person with FINRA, no
precedent requires us to conclude FINRA Rule 13200, in and of itself, constituted
an enforceable arbitration agreement between Berry and Appellants. Although
Appellants assert courts have uniformly interpreted a similar FINRA rule-Rule
12200-as an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, Rule 12200 pertains to disputes
between members and customers. See Waterford Inv. Servs., Inc. v. Bosco, 682
F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2012) ("The FINRA Code provides that a customer can
compel arbitration of a dispute 'between a customer and a member or associated
person of a member' when the dispute 'arises in connection with the business
activities of the member or the associated person.'" (quoting FINRA Rule 12200));
Id. ("This provision 'constitutes an "agreement in writing" under the
F[AA,] . . . which binds . . . [a FINRA] member, to submit an eligible dispute to arbitration upon a customer's demand.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting
Wash. Square Secs., Inc. v. Aune, 385 F.3d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 2004))). We have
been unable to identify any precedent extending the foregoing interpretations to
FINRA Rule 13200. Notwithstanding the language of FINRA Rule 13200, we
conclude the record must demonstrate the parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes,
independent of either party's registration with FINRA. See Towles, 338 S.C. at 37,
524 S.E.2d at 843-44 ("Arbitration is available only when the parties involved
contractually agree to arbitrate."). As we stated, the Forms U4 Appellants included
with their motion to compel arbitration did not demonstrate an agreement to
arbitrate existed between Appellants and Berry. We conclude that without such an
agreement, FINRA Rule 13200 does not bind an associated person to arbitrate his
disputes with a member. Accordingly, even assuming Berry was registered as an
associated person with FINRA, we conclude FINRA Rule 13200 did not constitute
an independent basis upon which to compel him to arbitrate his claims. We
therefore affirm the circuit court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration.
at Pages 11 - 12 of the 2021 Opinion
Bill Singer's Comment
Certainly, the 2021 Opinion will have its detractors, but, for me, it is an articulate bit of jurisprudence that declines the invitation to create an enforceable arbitration agreement where none actually exists. Before another court at another time, these same facts might prompt a finding of an arbitration agreement. But not today in South Carolina. And not here with Robert F. Berry. Given the often overly-generous findings of an enforceable arbitration agreement against former Wall Street employees by many courts, I'm not shedding any tears and I tip my hat to the South Carolina Court of Appeal's rationale that refuses to engage in legal alchemy. For my recent take on FINRA's mandatory industry arbitration rules, see "Voya Racial Discrimination Case Sheds Harsh Light On Wall Street Mandatory Arbitration" (BrokeAndBroker.com Blog / January 11, 2021)